Lessons From ‘The Party Of God’

What an Iran-backed terror organization can teach us about the future of warfare — and 21st century American foreign policy disasters.

Hezbollah (“The Party of God”) is a Shii’ite Islamic militant group based in Southern Lebanon.

It is backed by Iran, and considered to be one of the most sophisticated military organizations in the world. Israel considers Hezbollah, located on its northern border, to be one of its greatest threats.

There are two primary groups in Islam: Sunni and Shi’ite.

The religious differences aren’t worth discussing here. The point is, they often hate and fight each other.

The nation of Syria broke out in a civil war in 2012. Much of the country fell into chaos, invaded by Sunni ISIS fighters.

Lebanon shares a border with Syria. As soon as the civil war broke out, Hezbollah fighters crossed into Syria, fighting on behalf of Shi’ite President Bashar Al-Assad and against the Sunni militants.

Hezbollah is not a large fighting force by any means. They likely have no more than 20,000 active soldiers. The United States has over a million.

This small force entered a battlefield at the frontier of 21st Century warfare. Everything was up for grabs. Digital communications and social media were a feature, not a bug. None of the normal rules applied.

The Syrian government maintained control of parts of the country — particularly the capital, Damascus. The rest of the territory was filled with an assortment of groups, coalitions, and terror factions, who were often at war with each other as well.

In other words: no-man’s land.

Hezbollah’s previous military experience was on its home turf in Southern Lebanon, fighting and defending against Israeli attacks. It was deeply familiar with rural mountainous Lebanese geography and population.

In Syria, Hezbollah had to evolve to a new terrain. Much of the fighting took place in urban settings, against locals who knew the territory better than they did. In addition, the group needed to coordinate with Syrian, Iranian, and Russian forces, as well as Afghani, Pakistani and Iraqis deployed in the region.

Let’s also remember what they were up against. Syrian territory was flooded with Jihadist fighters from ISIS, an Islamic blood cult with the stated goal of conquering the entire world and killing all non-Muslims.

It’s not hard to see how this could get a bit… dangerous.

The local conditions and man-power constraints forced Hezbollah to constantly evolve.

Right from the beginning, the Hezbollah advantage over allies in Syria was evident. They were better trained, more disciplined, and had stronger leadership. Their presence brought a boost in morale to the Syrian Government, which was at great risk of collapse.

The Syrian army was armed with large, mechanized weapons, which were poorly suited for fighting against guerrilla forces in urban warfare. They may have been stronger in terms of pure military power, but they were slow and bloated — unable to keep up in this new form of battle.

Hezbollah’s agility was far more effective, using light infantry, reconnaissance, and sniper fire. It needed to navigate improvised explosive devices (IEDs), tunnels, and booby traps.

In the battle of Al-Qusayr, Hezbollah quickly cleared and re-captured a major highway that connected Damascus to Homs, a government Alawite (minority religious group) stronghold along the Mediterranean coast. This was a decisive victory, and served as an inflection point in the eventual survival of the Assad regime.

The fighting was fierce, and thousands of soldiers were killed. But in 2017, Hezbollah declared victory and exited Syria, leaving much of the country in the hands of the Assad government.

The lessons of Hezbollah and the Syrian Civil War are clear.

The group was prepared and agile, running circles around better armed but slower opponents. They were so sophisticated that they were able to both conduct their own operations and simultaneously train Syrian forces.

The field experience on more chaotic battlefields taught them critical lessons regarding the frontlines of modern warfare. And their coordination with multiple groups and stakeholders gave them powerful visibility in a number of areas, as well as tactical knowhow and the acquisition of military assets.

Let’s compare Hezbollah’s success to American failures.

After 9/11, the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. American forces quickly seized the capital cities of Kabul and Baghdad and proclaimed victory.

But they soon found themselves completely unprepared for a very different kind of warfare than they were used to — that is, the exact same war that Hezbollah fought against ISIS: urban light infantry warfare and insurgent attacks on rough mountainous terrain.

The Americans had far more forces and resources, but they were outmaneuvered by the same IEDs and tunnels that Hezbollah successfully navigated.

Strengths became weaknesses. Bigger was not better. Billions of dollars in military spending were helpless against smaller weapons that cost only hundreds of dollars to build.

It was as though the United States was still fighting the Cold War. Their opponents had moved on.

The Americans were not familiar with the terrain, and didn’t speak the language. Locals regarded them with hostility.

Several decades after the American invasions, hindsight is clear: these foreign policy actions were a disaster. Foundations crumbling. Models breaking. Humiliating defeats for a country that regarded itself as the most powerful in the world.

We must learn from everyone, especially our enemies. And if our enemies are running circles around us, we need to pay attention.

Hezbollah teaches us that throwing money at the problem doesn’t solve the problem. More manpower doesn’t equal dominance.

Hezbollah’s constraints played to its strengths. With fewer troops, it could move faster. It acted more like a tribe and less like a military. It was subject to minimal bureaucracy, and trained in rougher terrains. It fought in a region close to home, where it was better connected and spoke the language.

Most notably, Hezbollah learned from its opponents. It studied them and adopted their tactics, not insisting on fighting the wars of the last decade.

It was prepared for chaos and change — and ready for the future.